1 We are grateful to two anonymous referees and to Ekkehard König for detailed comments on earlier versions of this paper which improved the first draft considerably. Our gratitude also goes to Bernd Kortmann for helpful and efficient editorial work. We are solely responsible for any remaining shortcomings in the current version. We propose an explanation for a traditional puzzle in English linguistics involving the use of articles with the nominal modifiers same, identical and similar. Same can only take the definite article the, whereas identical and similar take either the or a. We argue that there is a fundamental difference in the manner in which a comparison is made with these modifiers. Identical and similar involve direct comparisons between at least two entities and an assertion of either full property matching (identical), or partial property matching (similar). The comparison with same proceeds differently: what is compared is not linguistic entities directly, but definite descriptions of these entities that can be derived through logical entailments. John and Mary live in the same house entails the house that John lives in is the (same) house that Mary lives in. There must be a pragmatic equivalence between these entailed definite descriptions, ranging from full referential equivalence to a possibly quite minimal overlap in semantic and real-world properties shared by distinct referents. These differences in meaning and article cooccurrence reveal the sensitivity of syntax to semantic and pragmatic properties, without which all and only the grammatical sentences of a language cannot be predicted.
In 1991 Hawkins proposed an integrated semantic-pragmatic-syntactic theory of various ungrammaticalities involving definite and indefinite articles in English in combination with other items in the noun phrase. He demonstrated that certain grammaticality distinctions are "extremely fine-tuned to the semantics and pragmatics" (Hawkins 1991: 434) . For instance, a noun modifier that normally carries a uniqueness entailment (and thus would require a co-occurring definite article) may on occasion not do so, and the indefinite article can then occur grammatically, as in a best buy and a first course in German versus *a wisest king (ibid.). Further contrasts that he was able to account for were an only child versus *an only student, a colour like red versus *a colour red, and I recalled a sweet little child that Mary used to be like versus *I recalled a sweet little child that Mary used to be. This is our starting point in this paper -we use information about the grammaticality of definite and indefinite articles with the modifiers same, identical and similar to shed light on some semantic and pragmatic properties of these items. We focus on these three modifiers and their respective interactions with the articles in English because they reveal some intriguing differences in meaning and usage that require a more detailed analysis than was given in Hawkins' earlier work.
We will also argue that despite the addition of numerous rich and informative studies during the last 25 years concerned with English articles and with these adjective modifiers, two essential questions have not been satisfactorily answered, involving the grammaticality of these noun phrases on the one hand, and their meanings on the other. First, why is the indefinite article ungrammatical with same (*a same house/the same house), whereas both a and the are grammatical with identical (an identical house/the identical house), as they are with similar (a similar house/the similar house)?
We are not aware of any convincing explanation for this in the literature, going beyond mere observation and stipulation, and yet it is a rather fundamental fact about the syntax of this area of English grammar which does need to be accounted for. It is also a rather surprising fact, since to assert of two or more objects that they are identical seems to involve a claim that "the objects belong to one and the same common type, exactly as is the case with same" (Hawkins 1978: 251) . Hawkins (1978 Hawkins ( :247-253, 1991 appealed to the uniqueness of the 'type' of entity to which same + noun refers, with or without the uniqueness and referential identity of tokens referred to, in order to explain the required co-occurrence with the uniqueness-entailing definite article. For identical he proposed that its meaning involved no such notion of abstract type for house, but instead full property for property matching between distinct referential tokens. The selection of articles with identical would be based in the usual way, he argued, on whether one of the referential tokens of house was or was not unique within a pragmatically restricted domain of interpretation (a "P-set", see Hawkins 1991). We will not continue this line of explanation here for the ungrammaticality of *a same but will propose a different account that makes no appeal to 'types'.
Second, there are some key differences in meaning and usage between same and identical whose theoretical significance has not been fully appreciated in the recent literature. For example, in her insightful and empirically detailed study of same and identical Breban (2010) gives numerous examples, including actual corpus data and usage statistics, of their use and meaning and concludes that "The postdeterminers same and identical clarify that the hearer can identify the instance by means of a phoric relation of identity or co-referentiality". She adds that the "postdeterminers same and identical in fact signal identity of reference by invoking the idea of non-identity: 'it is the same instance and not another one'. The determiner unit conjures up a second possible referent, only to deny it and to confirm that the referent the hearer has in mind, is the right one." Her notion of "identity" allows for "generalized" instances of e.g. a certain kind of house, following Langacker (1991 Langacker ( , 2005 cf. also Breban 2011) , in addition to strict referential identity and co-reference between tokens of the house in question, and she documents a rich array of uses for noun phrases containing same and identical. What is missing in her account, however, is an appreciation for the precise difference between them. This difference can be seen when one tries to replace same with identical in the illustrative corpus examples she gives in Breban (2010) .
On p.212 (op cit.), for example, she cites the following attested use (her (7.41)):
(1) A dog which plunged 400ft down a mountainside had its fall broken by two climbers who had plunged through the same ice hole.
If we replace the same ice hole in (1) with the identical ice hole the reference changes to a quite different ice hole from the one that the two climbers had plunged through and the sentence will receive a very different pragmatic interpretation:
(2) A dog which plunged 400ft down a mountainside had its fall broken by two climbers who had plunged through the identical ice hole. A dog which plunges through one ice hole cannot normally in our world have its fall broken by climbers who are in another, albeit "identical", ice hole. If the climbers were formerly in another, identical ice hole and are now somehow in the "same" one as the plunging dog, then the sentence may be interpretable and avoid pragmatic anomaly. But this contrast makes clear that same and identical pattern differently in English definite
NPs with respect to their referents, their co-reference and the manner in which "a second possible referent" is evoked (Breban 2010:212) . Contrary to what Breban claims in the quotes above, this second referent is not denied in (2), but is actually asserted.
Hence whatever similarities and overlaps there are in English definite NPs containing same and identical, there are profound differences as well which are not being accounted for.
In earlier joint work with Davidse and Van linden (Davidse et al. 2008 ), Breban also equated same with identical and pointed out that these post-determiners "merely emphasise the coreferentiality and inclusive reference conveyed by the primary determiners". This was in line with other studies (Barker 2007; subsequently Brasoveanu 2011) that have tried to equate the meanings of the definite article and same and to blend them into one. But definite descriptions with same are not used merely for the purpose of emphasis or inclusive/unique reference. They involve instead a form of reference that can be best understood by going back to the basic logic of Russell's (1905) theory of definite descriptions and to the kind of pragmatic extension of his theory that was developed in Hawkins (1978 Hawkins ( , 1991 . Hawkins' (op cit) proposal was that the existence and uniqueness of definite referents needs to be interpreted relative to different pragmatic sets (his "P-sets") within a pragmatically structured universe of particularly interesting recent proposal for describing these in terms of "strong" definites). Many other appropriate uses of the definite article in English, for example various "situational" and "associative" uses, have been summarised in C. Lyons (1999 ), in Hawkins (1978 , 1991 , and in more traditional works such as Christophersen (1939) and Jespersen (1949) . What is new in the present study is an explanation for the semantically different uses of same, as well as the reason we shall propose for its obligatory use with the definite article. Another original contribution is the contrastive discussion of the various meaning possibilities for same, identical and similar. Our point of departure is that grammaticality distinctions in article usage provide an independent piece of evidence, in the form of syntactic wellformedness judgments, for subtle semantic features of these adjectives of comparison. Our claim will be that there is a difference in the semantics of the comparison and in what exactly is being compared, and that this is what underlies the article co-occurrence differences.
Briefly, identical and similar in combination with singular nouns refer to a single entity (a pragmatically unique one if preceded by the and generally a non-unique one if preceded by a) whose existence is entailed, and this single entity is compared with a second distinct entity or entities, whose existence is also entailed. house that has been insightfully discussed by Langacker (1991 , 2005 ) and Breban (2010 , 2011 In what follows we explain this idea further and we exemplify the overlaps as well as crucial differences in article usage between same, identical and similar and in the semantic interpretations that characterise these expressions. We will also account for the fact that same is not semantically vacuous in combination with the definite article.
Same is a relational term. It has a more restrictive meaning than the definite article, but this latter is required in co-occurrence with same because same involves a form of double definiteness, a comparison over two definite descriptions, each of which requires the, with at least some partial equivalence between them either at the level of their referents, or (for non-identical referents) at the level of the semantic properties within the respective definite descriptions. This partial equivalence gives the same features in common with both similar and identical, as we shall see, but crucially the same differs from these latter over what exactly is being compared, two definite descriptions with pragmatic equivalence in the one case, versus two distinct referential tokens with full or partial property matching in the other. Since what is being compared is two definite descriptions, and since an equivalence is being asserted between them, the single NP in the entailing sentence can be no less definite than the definite descriptions being compared, and hence it has to be the same not *a same. The definite article on its own captures uniqueness of singular entities in general and in a whole variety of contexts (previous discourse, situation of utterance, 'association sets' or frames, etc., see
Hawkins 1991). In order to explain our theory more fully, we need to go back to basics:
Russell's (1905) theory of definite descriptions. Consider the definite description in sentence (3):
The house was sold.
According to Russell's (1905) analysis, its logical translation would be (4) (ignoring the semantics of the past tense):
there is an x which is a house and there is no y such that y is a house and non-identical to x and x was sold Example (3) accordingly makes three claims: (3) is true, then each of the italicised sentences in (5a), (5b) and (5c) will be true, and hence (3) entails the conjunction of the italicised sentences (5a)-(5c).
The crucial distinction between (3) and the corresponding indefinite description (6) lies in the uniqueness claim:
(6) A house was sold. (7) Ǝx (H(x) and S(x)) i.e. there is an x which is a house and x was sold
The truth of sentence (6) requires that there should be at least one house that was sold. It is logically compatible with there being more than one such, or with one only, and so (6) is logically neutral to uniqueness and does not actually contradict it. Existence and predication entailments are shared between (3) and (6) and hence (3) entails (6) their references so as to understand a given unique one on a given occasion, in the manner of Grice (1975) ? The answer given in Hawkins (1978 Hawkins ( , 1991 appeals to the pragmatic structuring of the universe of discourse and to the existence of pragmatic sets (P-sets) within which uniqueness is achieved in everyday discourse. Hawkins (1991) also explains why indefinite descriptions are neutral to uniqueness on some occasions, but contrast with the on other occasions and "implicate" non-uniqueness (a senator can refer to one of the 100 senators of the US senate, but a president cannot refer to the unique president of the USA).
Consider now the definite article + modifier combinations of the present paper, starting with (8), (9) and (10): (8) The same house was sold.
(9) The identical house was sold.
(10) The similar house was sold.
Compare (8) and (9) first. The interesting, and at first apparently contradictory, point to note about the identical house in (9) is that it makes an existence and a uniqueness claim about the house in question in accordance with Russell's semantics in (4) and (5), i.e. that there is some house x and there is no house y non-identical to x. But at the same time we have seen that the semantics of identical does assert the existence of some other house y non-identical to x (recall example (2) with the identical ice hole)! The apparent contradiction is resolved by appealing to a pragmatically more fine-tuned universe of discourse within which the semantics of the identical house is interpreted, for example the "previous discourse set" shared by a given speaker-hearer pair and containing entities that they have talked about (cf. Hawkins 1991). Appropriate usage of the identical house can be achieved if this set contains just one house with the property of the unique x of which {Hj} holds is in fact identical to the unique y of which {Hm} holds. There is an equivalence between these two definite descriptions that figure in the It is also an equivalence that requires only a partial overlap between the definite descriptions being compared, 'the x ({Hj} x)' and 'the y ({Hm} y)', either at the level of the properties that figure in the definite description, {Hj} and {Hm} etc, or at the level of the referents x and y.
The semantic and pragmatic analysis of the similar house in (10) proceeds as for the identical house in (9). There is an existing and unique house x within some pragmatically defined set and the definite description achieves its uniqueness by being the only x in that set with partial property matching to some other referent y whose existence is entailed and also possibly within the same pragmatic set, resulting in appropriate sequences such as The house that John owns was sold and so was the similar house that Mary owns.
Notice finally in this section that sentences corresponding to (8)- (10) with the indefinite article, namely (11)- (13), involve ungrammaticality in the case of *a same, as we have mentioned, and a different semantics and pragmatic interpretation for an identical and a similar compared with their definite counterparts:
(11) *A same house was sold.
(12) An identical house was sold. the indefinite article will be used for identical and similar as in (12)- (13), and it will be asserted that there is at least one house (the direct referent) that is fully or partially matching in properties to the indirect referent(s). and similar is, we claim, more straightforward and less abstract and applies to linguistic and real-world entities directly, not to logically entailed definite descriptions of these entities. The difference between identical and similar is then one of full versus partial property matching between these entities. The greater variability in the interpretation of the same + Noun, which we shall now illustrate, is a consequence of this more abstract and linguistically specified comparison between descriptions of entities, as opposed to the direct comparison between entities themselves which is characteristic of identical and similar.
One consequence of this form of comparison with the same is that it allows for considerable ambiguity with respect to the unique entity that it refers to. This entity can What the same invites us to compare is two logically entailed definite descriptions, for example the house that John lives in, 'the x ({Hj} x)', and the house that Mary lives in, 'the y ({Hm} y)'. The claim made by same is that there is at least some equivalence between these two that is pragmatically sufficient for the comparison and equivalence to be made. In the extreme case x=y and all the properties of {Hj} will be identical to those of {Hm}. This is full logical equivalence between definite descriptions and we see it realised when one and the same house token is involved. But when there are different house tokens (x≠y) there must then be some equivalence between entities at the level of their properties, i.e. between {Hm} and {Hj}, and just how much equivalence there needs to be at the property level, in order to describe relevant items as the same, seems to be pragmatically highly variable and contextdependent. That is why we claim that the kind of equivalence between definite descriptions that is required, in general, for the appropriate use of the same, may be fullbodied logical equivalence at the one end between referential tokens and their
properties, but only a much looser and pragmatically sanctioned equivalence at the other, between some of the properties of {Hj} and {Hm}. Levinson (2000), requiring cancellation in different contexts in the event that the implicature is not intended, as seen in the following examples involving jackets:
(15) (a) John and Bill were wearing the same jacket but for the buttons.
(b) John and Bill were wearing the same jacket but for the colour.
(c) ?John and Bill were wearing the same jacket but for the style. An extreme case illustrating the role of real-world knowledge in sanctioning an acceptable equivalence between two definite descriptions at the property level is the following. Every massive California redwood tree begins its life cycle as a tiny seed.
Comparing a token of each, the fully grown tree and the seed, it would be possible to say: These are the same (tree); thereby establishing the link across times between the fully grown redwood and the seed that is, despite appearances, the same tree. The entities in question are known to change radically over time, but their very different appearances at different stages are not sufficient to block the pragmatic equivalence of two definite descriptions (the redwood tree that is fully grown is the same tree as the But we can say that they are the same (tree), because of the time and life cycle link that is known to connect the definite descriptions describing these tokens.
Returning to jackets and the like, notice that whereas different colours may not be sufficient to block pragmatic equivalence between definite descriptions for these items, they may do so for others. Compare (16a) and (16b):
(16) (a) ?Their eyes were the same except for the colour.
(b) The two women were the same except for the colour of their eyes.
In (16a) colour is an important and salient property of any pair of eyes, and one pair would not normally be deemed equivalent to another if that feature contrasts. Two women as a whole, however, possess many more properties than their respective eye colours, and so the comparison of one woman token with another can overlook this particular feature and establish sufficient equivalence between them at the level of their properties, despite their different eye colours. In the more limited context of eyes alone colour is too important a difference to render an equivalence plausible.
Notice finally in this section the interesting compound form selfsame in Modern English, which through the addition of the reflexive and intensifier form self to same results in preferred readings for the same that stress referential identity and co-reference Identical occurs with both a and the, as we have seen, though the use of the latter is pragmatically restricted to cases where there have been previous mentions, as in (17a) and also (18b) below.
(17) (a) Jackie was wearing an identical dress to the one that I was wearing. The identical dress caused a lot of trouble at the party! (b) Jackie was wearing a similar dress to the one I was wearing. The similar dress caused a lot of trouble at the party!
We mentioned in Section 1 that a central difference between the same and identical lies in the number of entities referred to, namely reference to at least two for identical vs. way a prince can refer to one of the princes of England, a senator to one of the US senators, a window to one of the house's windows, and so on (Hawkins 1978 (Hawkins , 1991 .
Consider now some further examples that highlight this difference between identical and the same:
(19) (a) Jane was wearing an identical jacket to the one Mary wore yesterday; in fact, it was the same [one]! (b) Jane was wearing an identical jacket, but it was not the same [one that Mary wore yesterday].
(c) Jane was wearing the same jacket, not an identical one.
(d) Jane was wearing the same jacket that Mary wore yesterday, or rather, an identical one.
In (19a) the speaker first believes that there are two jacket tokens and then realises that there was just a single one and so corrects the reference to the same, after first using an identical. Example (19b) clearly signals that the jacket in question was a separate token from the token in an earlier reference (to the jacket that Mary wore the day before).
Example (19c) emphasises the singularity of the jacket token, i.e. there was only one jacket, not two that were identical. In (19d) we have the same situation as in (19b), but in reverse. The speaker first thinks there was only one token, and then realises that there were actually two and decides to correct himself.
When the pragmatic interpretation of the same involves distinct referential tokens, however, the contrast with identical is much less and both (20a) and (b) can be used:
(20) (a) Mary and Jane wore an identical jacket.
(b) Mary and Jane wore the same jacket.
In (20a) two distinct jacket tokens are being referred to, and it is asserted that they match one another in all their properties, hence they are identical. Notice that even though identical involves the matching of all properties across different tokens in the normal case, a certain latitude in its descriptive meaning is also permitted. The following are appropriate uses of identical even when the sharing of all properties is explicitly denied:
(21) (a) Jackie was wearing an identical dress to mine, except for the colour. Similar is usually preceded by the indefinite article, except when it is previously mentioned and the context allows the use of the definite article (recall (17b)), as was the case for identical (in (17a)). Grammatically, similar patterns like identical, therefore.
Semantically, it differs from identical in that the concept of similarity involves the sharing of only some criterial properties and not of all. For example:
(22) (a) Jackie was wearing a similar dress to the one I was wearing.
(b) Bill bought a similar car to ours.
(c) He saw a similar tree to the one we saw. The similar tree was by the orange house down the road.
In examples (22a-c) we have different tokens that share a number of properties (some but not all), by virtue of which they can be referred to as similar to one another. This near-identity together with the potential variability with regard to which properties are shared and which are not allows for an infinity of similarity descriptions and hence for the indefinite article (unless prior reference is available, as in 22c). The same, by contrast, does not have a focus on property-matching between distinct individuals but rather on the pragmatic equivalence between definite descriptions that are logically entailed by the sentence containing the same.
The reason why the is uncomfortable with similar is because the sharing of only some criterial properties makes the existence of other, similar entities inevitable, in general, which conflicts with the uniqueness of definiteness. When the nature and number of other similar entities can be brought under pragmatic control, as in (22c), the definite article becomes possible with similar. entailed by sentences containing the same + Noun. Since the entailed descriptions are definite, and since there is an assertion of pragmatic equivalence between them, the single Noun Phrase with same in the sentence that entails them must also be definite and same must be preceded by the, and only by the. Hence the ungrammaticality of *a same.
Identical and similar, by contrast, can both occur with both articles in English since their (direct) referents can be potentially non-unique or unique. Despite the fact that identical is semantically closer to same in terms of the sharing of all properties (this being implicated for same, unless cancelled recall (15), and entailed for identical, unless the entailment is explicitly denied, recall (21)), unique identifiability of the referent is not a part of the meaning of identical or similar, as it is with same.. There is no semantic and grammatical requirement for a co-occurring definite article with identical and similar, therefore, as there is for same, and the choice of a versus the will reflect the availability or otherwise of appropriate reference tokens in the relevant pragmatic set (cf. Hawkins 1991) containing the entities to which the identical house or an identical house refer.
We can conclude that the English articles, and syntactic grammaticality judgements involving their co-occurrence, provide a unique insight into both the semantics of same, identical and similar, and into the extreme sensitivity of the syntax to their semantic properties. These article+modifier ungrammaticalities pattern like the many others discussed in Hawkins (1978 Hawkins ( , 1991 that are all fine-tuned to semantic differences. It would be impossible to write syntactic rules predicting all and only the grammatical sentences of English in this area without the grammar having access to these semantic and pragmatic distinctions in some form, as argued in Hawkins (ibid). 
